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Scalable Detection and Drill-down of Cybersecurity Events 
ABSTRACT 
Cybersecurity analysts detect malicious activities using rules that process and correlate 
events from log files. Not every detection necessarily points to malicious activity; rather, a 
detection can prompt a cybersecurity analyst to drill down into the underlying events to 
determine if the detection indicates a true attack. The drilling-down of detections is difficult due 
to the large size of log files, large numbers of detection rules, and the large number of events per 
detection. This disclosure describes techniques to determine and to display all the events from all 
detections from any rule in near real-time. A first stage translates cybersecurity rules to 
parallelized database queries, finds detections, and finds references to a subset of the event 
samples. A second stage dereferences the event identifier and returns actual event samples. In a 
third stage, the cybersecurity analyst can execute a query to get all event samples associated with 
a given detection. 
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BACKGROUND 
Cybersecurity analysts detect malicious activity by processing and correlating logs. A 
line of a log file typically includes machine data representing some event, e.g., a failed login 
from a certain machine, a DNS lookup from another machine, etc. When normalized 
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(reformatted in a manner independent of machine vendor and common across platforms) and 
correlated together, log lines provide a picture of the activities occurring in the environment. 
Rules are written to detect activities that are likely malicious. Meaningful detections are often the 
result of multiple events that occur in a particular sequence within a narrow time range. For 
example, an event could be a failed login. Two such events separated by hours are unremarkable 
and do not constitute a detection. On the other hand, a large number of failed logins, possibly 
from multiple locations, within a single second constitute a detection. 
Every detection does not necessarily point to malicious activity; rather, a detection can 
prompt a cybersecurity analyst to drill down into the underlying events to determine if the 
detection indicates a true attack. The drilling-down of detections is difficult for certain reasons, 
such as, for example: 
● Event logs can be petabytes in size, and detection rules can number in the thousands. 
Rules can produce thousands of detections per day, each possibly with thousands of 
events. When cybersecurity analysts receive a detection alert, they try to drill down into 
the detection to see the events comprising the detection. An analyst who doesn’t know 
the events will not trust the detection and cannot easily investigate further. Being present 
in the log lines in both raw and normalized forms, events can occupy substantial space. 
The sheer scale of the data makes it difficult to show analysts all detections and all their 
underlying events. Existing approaches sometimes fail to capture as few as ten events per 
detection. 
● Cybersecurity analysts expect rules to find detections as soon as logs are generated. This 
requires the continuous processing of streams of data and of reprocessing old data, in turn 
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placing a high performance burden, e.g., end-to-end latency and compute/ storage/ 
network costs, on the detection jobs.  
 
Fig. 1: Drilling down on a detection to determine its severity 
 Fig. 1 illustrates the complexity of drilling down on a detection to determine its severity. 
Naive approaches such as running a single query to gather all detections and all events, or 
running the database query on multiple shards of data, have debilitating memory-consumption 
problems, take too long to complete, and fail due to the large size of events or the number of 
events per detection. 
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes techniques to determine and display to cybersecurity analysts 
the events from all detections from any rule in near real-time. Per the techniques, a first stage of 
execution translates rules to database queries, parallelizes the queries, finds detections, and finds 
references to a subset of the event samples. Effectively, the first stage splits and filters event data 
into small, queryable subsets and creates references (links) to the events, known as event 
identifiers. The use of event identifiers reduces the amount of data to be passed around. For 
example, an event identifier can occupy a few bytes while the event it points to can be larger, 
e.g., as large as a page. 
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A second stage of execution compiles database queries to dereference the event identifier, 
correlates the event identifier to the actual event samples, and returns the event samples or 
persists them in a database. A third stage is an on-demand query that can be executed on behalf 
of a cybersecurity analyst to get all event samples associated with a given detection. Typically, a 
cybersecurity analyst will execute the third stage if there are more event samples than the 
number persisted into the database.  
 
Fig. 2: Fetching detections and a subset of event samples in the first execution stage and 
dereferencing event-identifiers in the second execution stage 
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Fig. 2 illustrates fetching detections and a subset of event samples in the first execution 
stage and dereferencing event-identifiers in the second execution stage. A controller (202) 
processes a cybersecurity detection rule (210a) by reading the rule (210b) from a database of 
rules and detections (204) and by compiling the rule into structured query language (SQL) (210c) 
using a compiler (206). The compiled query is partitioned (212a) amongst worker processes 
(208), and each partitioned query is run in parallel (212c) on different data segments stored in a 
data warehouse (209). In a further level of parallelization, each worker process makes a query to 
the data warehouse and the data warehouse may optionally parallelize the query across multiple 
machines when actually doing the work. A query run can find thousands of detections each with 
tens of event identifiers (212b). 
Once these detections and event identifiers are found, a supplemental query (214c) is run 
in the second execution stage (214a) using the event identifiers to gather the real normalized 
events and lookup-tokens for the raw events (214b). Similar to the first stage, query executions 
in the second stage can be parallelized (214d). The normalized events/lookup tokens are merged 
with the detection (216a), and the detection persisted (216b) into the database along with a 
certain number, e.g., ten, of normalized events/lookup-tokens. Because the detection query only 
finds identifiers, e.g., references, for the normalized events/lookup-tokens, memory consumption 
is greatly reduced. When a cybersecurity analyst issues a command to see detections for a rule, 
the database is queried to get the detections and their corresponding normalized events/lookup-
tokens. The lookup tokens are mapped to the raw log, merged with the response, and returned to 
the analyst. 
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Fig. 3: Fetching all event samples associated with a detection, in the third stage 
 As illustrated in Fig. 3, when analysts want to see all the events associated with a 
detection (302), e.g., beyond the ones persisted into the database along with the detection, 
another database query (306) is generated from the rule (304) and run on-demand (308). This 
database query combines (303) the rule and the detection from the previous database query into a 
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tightly constrained query. By using the detection from the previous query, this new query can 
filter out irrelevant data and is able to rapidly return event data corresponding to the detection 
(312). As in previous execution stages, the query can be parallelized (310). The creation of an 
extremely constrained query enables its rapid execution on an on-demand basis to determine the 
actual underlying events corresponding to a detection. Alternatively, at substantial storage and 
retrieval costs, all events can be persisted into a database. 
 The above-described partitioning of the query is similar to horizontal/vertical partitioning 
in distributed databases. Here, a query is horizontally partitioned by running many similar 
queries, each targeting different logical data shards, and vertically partitioned by querying for 
references to data rather than the actual data. The technique of splitting queries into multiple 
stages and running supplemental, on-demand queries can be used beyond security applications, 
e.g., in any normalized, vertically-partitioned, or horizontally-partitioned database. In such 
situations, multiple parallel processes can be run, each querying a shard of data to find 
identifiers; supplemental queries can be run to map the identifiers to the underlying data; and the 
results of the queries merged and returned to the user. If the user needs additional pages of the 
data, then the previous results and the original query can be merged to generate a new, tightly 
constrained query. 
In this manner, the techniques of this disclosure enable cybersecurity analysts to collect 
all events pertaining to a cybersecurity detection and make an efficient determination of the 
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CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes techniques to determine and to display all the events from all 
detections from any rule in near real-time. A first stage translates cybersecurity rules to 
parallelized database queries, detects events, and finds references to the event samples. A second 
stage dereferences the event identifier and returns actual event samples. In a third stage, the 
cybersecurity analyst can execute a query to get all event samples associated with a given 
detection. 
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